Ian Proops (University of Texas at Austin)

Abstract

In the second edition of the first Critique, Kant portrays the enlightened, critical philosopher as addressing two distinct audiences: the academic world, on one hand, and the reading public, on the other. Insofar as they address the first group, Kant thinks, the enlightened philosopher should engage in the critique of reason; insofar as they address the second, however, they should instead produce a public-facing, non-dogmatic metaphysics —a project which involves devising various 'proofs useful for the world.'

This paper asks after the nature of this envisaged public-facing metaphysics with respect to a single question: the existence of an afterlife for human beings. I argue that in this case Kant treats the relevant 'proof useful for the world' as an inference by analogy—a non-demonstrative proof aimed at producing neither knowledge, nor opinion, nor even morally grounded belief, but rather what he calls doctrinal belief. Since Kant elsewhere seems to suggest that arguments by analogy are in some way defective, this poses a puzzle: how can doctrinal beliefs, which Kant conceives of as typically very firmly held, be justified by arguments he himself describes as mere 'crutches for human reason'? Is Kant being underhand and even manipulative in seeking to produce conviction in others by means of arguments he himself regards as dubious? I endeavor to resolve the puzzle (and allay the concern) by arguing that Kant's actual assessment of arguments by analogy is considerably more favorable than this ‘crutches' metaphor, and his other negative remarks, might seem to suggest.